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I. Executive Summary 
 
The People’s Republic of China has joined the international movement toward greater 
government transparency, including making government records and decision-making 
more accessible to its citizens.2  While China is very much aware of and indeed has 
drawn lessons from this international trend, the primary force nudging China to adopt a 
more open form of governance is domestic dynamics.   
 
Transparency in China is in a transitional phase.  Like many countries, China has 
a long tradition of government secrecy.  The incremental progress toward greater 
information openness in China over the past 25 years was not triggered by a particular 
national crisis or scandal, as happened in some other countries like the United States and 
Eastern Europe, although most changes in China during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
might well be attributed to a desire to prevent any repeat of the decade of lawlessness and 
destruction called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-76.  Instead, the 
transition toward greater transparency appears to have grown out of the confluence of an 
“open village affairs” movement that arose in the early 1980s, natural pressures for 
greater information from rapid economic development, momentum from the information 
technology revolution and the demands of foreign trade and investment as reflected in 
China’s 2001 commitments to the World Trade Organization. 
 
China is planning for but does not yet have an information access law.  General 
goals of greater governmental openness have been enunciated in national policy over 
more than a decade, but have been carried out in a piecemeal fashion throughout the 
country.  However, concepts such as the government’s obligation to disclose information 
and the people’s “right to know” are beginning to be translated into legal rights and 
obligations in experimental local legislation that should help institutionalize what the 
Chinese refer to as “open government information.”   
 
This paper will discuss the development of open government information in 
China, as well as the prospects for China’s further opening. 
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II.   Introduction to the Chinese Context   
 
China hosts the world’s largest population, with approximately 1.3 billion people 
living in an area slightly smaller that the United States.  The People’s Republic of China 
was founded on October 1, 1949, as a “dictatorship of the people” led by the Communist 
Party of China (the Party), which retains a monopoly on political power today.   
 
Following disastrous Party programs of collectivization and communization, and a 
chaotic decade of “Cultural Revolution” that left China’s economy and society in 
shambles, China adopted the “open-door” policy in 1978 to increase foreign trade and 
selectively welcome foreign investment in the formerly closed country.  Since that time, 
market reforms have gradually replaced central planning, reducing the number and 
economic contribution of state-owned enterprises, increasingly supporting private 
enterprise and lifting price controls on all but a handful of commodities.  Today, some 
60% of industrial output is produced by non-state enterprises, under what is termed a 
“socialist market economy.”  In 2002, the Party set a goal of turning China into a middle-
income country with a “well off” population by 2020.  Economic development remains 
the Party’s top priority. 
 
 These reforms, which have made China one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world, with a 9.1% rate of economic growth in 2003, have been accompanied by 
enormous social change.  The “iron rice bowl” of guaranteed employment and related 
social benefits for urban residents has been replaced with a market economy in which 
they must find or make their own jobs.  Farmers are increasingly leaving the land to seek 
opportunities in the cities.  Personal freedoms have expanded with the widespread 
loosening of social controls.  Change has been supported by establishment of a rather 
sophisticated body of law adapted in many cases from successful models of other 
countries, although enforcement of these new laws remains problematic.  Concepts of 
private property rights have gradually taken hold and were recognized in an amendment 
to China’s Constitution in March 2004.  An accompanying amendment for the first time 
enshrined the notion of respecting and protecting human rights in China. 
 
While economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty 
over the past few decades, this has occurred primarily in the industrial eastern part of the 
country.  The government admits there are at least 85 million rural residents who live on 
less than US$75 per year and cannot afford quality food, education and health care.  
Pressing problems such as sharp rural-urban and regional disparities, environmental 
degradation and rampant corruption, which estimates value at some 3-5% of GDP,3 are 
giving rise to increasing social unrest.  Concern over instability prompted the current 
leadership to focus on better balanced and sustainable development rather than growth for 
its own sake, as well as on new mechanisms to help better manage change.  
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Amidst all this change, political reform has been modest.  The Party, comprised of 
some 6.5 million members, or about 5% of the population, seeks to maintain tight control 
over policy formulation and implementation, and Party functionaries often concurrently 
hold government positions, creating what is commonly referred to as the Chinese “Party-
state.”   
 
Under China’s Constitution, all power belongs to the people, and state power is 
exercised by the people through the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local people’s 
congresses at the provincial, county and township levels. The State Council, China’s 
Cabinet appointed by the NPC, is the highest executive body, overseeing China’s central 
ministries and the work of local governments. The people’s courts, also answerable to the 
NPC, are part of the administrative structure.  The standing committees of the congresses, 
not the courts at the same level, interpret the national or local laws, for example. The 
Constitution further specifies that the Communist Party of China is the sole political party 
in power.  Other political parties and non-governmental or civic groups and associations 
are tightly regulated and subject to official approval and registration. 
 
The current constitutional structure provides for a four-tiered system of direct 
elections for deputies to people’s congresses at the township and county level, and 
indirect elections for the provincial and national people’s congresses.  The congresses at 
each level, rather than the populace at large, elect the government and judicial officials at 
the same level. Slates of candidates at all stages and all levels are largely controlled by 
the Party. The system as designed, lacking truly open, competitive and direct elections, 
fosters vertical patron-client relations between the Party leaders at higher levels who 
recommend the candidates for lower level Party, congressional, government and judicial 
positions, and horizontal accountability between local government and judicial officials 
on the one hand and the congress and Party organization at the same level that actually 
elected them on the other.  Consequently, congressional deputies and government 
officials have felt little sense of accountability to the people they ostensibly represent, 
and the Chinese people have traditionally known little about their representatives and the 
matters they are handling, even though China’s Constitution calls on the people to 
“supervise” government work.   
 
Change is occurring, however. Since the early 1980s, the Party has endorsed direct, 
competitive and non-partisan elections at the most local level of governance, in China’s 
700,000 villages where some 900 million rural citizens live.  While the Party recognizes 
that electing one’s leaders at a very local level can foster greater trust and stability, it is 
hesitant to introduce that practice at higher, more formal political levels, where 
candidates are less well-known, issues become more complex and voters are more likely 
to organize around different issues, building pressure to permit competing political 
parties to represent their interests.  Stimulated by successful experience with the village 
election model, however, the Party is permitting experiments with more competitive (but 
non-partisan) congressional and direct governmental elections at the township and county 
levels, as well as promoting directly-elected urban community councils. Elections within 
the Party itself are becoming more open and competitive.  Party policy purports to 
support the strengthening of what it refers to as “socialist democracy,” to better allow the 
 4
people to make their will known and to supervise government, all under the leadership of 
the Party, however.    
 
What explains these changes?  To over-simplify, the Party leadership seems to 
recognize that, in order to maintain the Party’s legitimacy, curb corruption and address 
the complex issues of governance amidst rapid development, the traditional model of 
governance must be adjusted.  China’s leaders acknowledge that a modernizing China 
requires a government that is efficient, law-abiding and relatively open, one that 
facilitates, rather than controls, social and economic development and one that enjoys the 
trust of the Chinese people.  To this end, the current leadership seeks to foster what the 
Party calls “political civilization,” which encompasses development of the “rule of law” 
and of certain more democratic mechanisms to implement the constitutional right and 
duty of Chinese citizens to serve as “masters of their country” and “supervise” 
government.  Such mechanisms include, importantly, greater access to government 
information. 
  
III.  Development of Government Transparency in China 
 
From the Countryside to the City 
 
The current emphasis within the Party and government on greater openness of 
information and of government affairs generally traces its origins to the collectivization 
and commune ideology of the Party, with its legacy of farmer participation at the 
commune (now the village) level and expectations of transparency, especially in local 
finances.4  This tradition helped shape the more recent development of directly elected 
and self-governing villager committees and the related “open village affairs” program.5   
 
Villagers spontaneously organized the first largely autonomous villager committees 
in 1980 to manage communal properties and agricultural production.6  The dismantling of 
the rural communes following the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) left a vacuum in 
political, production and community organization in China’s vast and impoverished 
countryside below the township level, as well as a legacy of mistrust between farmers 
and Party cadres.  Party leaders supported the advent of directly elected villager 
committees, hoping the system would promote stability and economic prosperity by 
allowing villagers to choose leaders they trusted, by making those leaders directly 
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accountable to their constituents and by implementing a system of open village affairs, 
which emphasized financial disclosure on the part of the elected village leaders.     
 
Despite unevenness of implementation, the village open affairs and self-governance 
program was highly popular among the people and higher-level officials where it was 
implemented well.  By the late 1990s, the “open village affairs” program was evolving 
into a broader “open government affairs” movement that was promoted in top-level Party 
and government policy documents. 7   
 
  The adoption by the NPC in November 1998 of the permanent Organic Law on 
Villagers Committees (the VC Law) 8 marked a significant advance in the 
institutionalization of more open governance at the village level.   The VC Law requires 
directly elected villagers committees (VCs) to implement the “four democracies” of 
direct democratic election of VC members; democratic decision-making through the 
villager assemblies comprised of all eligible voters; democratic management by the VCs; 
and democratic supervision by the villagers under new systems of “openness in village 
affairs.”  VCs must publish financial information, in particular, at least once every six 
months and guarantee the truthfulness of the information disclosed, as well as respond to 
inquiries from the villagers.  Villagers refer to this disclosure system as the “Sunshine 
Project.”9   
 
 In a March 1999 speech  on villager self-rule, a vice premier described a growing 
rural concept of a “right to information” tied to economic development: “Following the 
deepening of rural reform and development of the market economy, farmers’ thinking, 
concepts and value orientation have undergone profound changes.  Their sense of 
democracy and their sense of participating in the management of economic and social 
affairs have constantly increased.  And more and more they want to have the right to 
information, dialogue and decision-making.  They long for direct participation in making 
decisions on major affairs in the village and the management of village affairs.” 10 
 
Meanwhile, in the cities urbanites were increasingly leaving the “iron rice bowl” 
of guaranteed employment by the government or state-owned enterprises and institutions, 
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which had included employer-provided housing, schooling, medical treatment and 
retirement benefits, to pursue entrepreneurship or work for the emerging private sector.  
As their numbers swelled, and as concepts of property rights developed with the advent 
of private housing and business ownership, the demand for greater information relating to 
business and the economy as well as social services grew.  Residents and businesses, for 
example, needed information on urban development plans in order to make decisions 
about where to invest in a new home or office building.11  The development of China’s 
stock markets prompted establishment of new information disclosure standards systems 
to promote greater corporate transparency.12  
 
 In the year 2000, a detailed joint Party and State Council notice13 officially 
extended the open affairs program from the village to the township, which is the most 
basic level of formal government in China.  The notice emphasized publicizing all 
financial affairs and making it “convenient” for the people to supervise the work of 
township governments by providing more information and involving the people more in 
decision-making.  Townships were instructed to set up public bulletin boards, much as 
was the practice in villages, and adopt other means to regularly communicate with the 
public.  The notice further instructed the higher-level county governments to prepare for 
instituting open government affairs programs.  By 2003, the even higher-level municipal 




While the substantive notions of government transparency were beginning to 
spread throughout Chinese government, Chinese universities and agencies were 
constructing a technical platform that would support and further promote this information 
transformation. In the early 1980s, the Chinese government took the first steps to use new 
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information technologies such as computers and the Internet to make government 
information more accessible throughout government itself, to strengthen the capacity to 
share information in support of government-directed industrialization and economic 
development, and make government more efficient.  In December 1999, the Party 
established a Leading Group on National Informatization to set policy in this area.  A 
State Council Information Office was subsequently set up to carry out “informatization” 
policies, and it was decided to develop a government “Intranet” to build a government 
database and share information.   
 
The initial emphasis of China’s “E-government” program was on internal sharing 
of information among different agencies and vertically from the center to the localities to 
facilitate all kinds of government services and functions, including tax collection, foreign 
trade and technological development, rather than providing greater information to the 
Chinese public. Through linking of databases, for example, tax authorities discovered that 
many companies that were registered with the industrial and commercial bureau had not 
registered with them to pay corporate income tax.15  As the information database grew 
and technology advanced, this program established the technical platform for and a new 
norm of sharing more and more information. Central and local government agencies 
began making an ever-increasing amount of information about government functions and 
activities, and providing administrative services, to the public over the Web.  These new 
practices and changing attitudes toward the utility of a freer information flow spurred 
development of open government affairs programs.16   
 
The rapid spread of Internet use, buttressed by the proliferation of Internet cafes 
for those without access to their own personal computers, extended the information 
revolution more and more to the ordinary citizen. As of the end of 2004, more than 87 
million registered Chinese used the Internet17 to access all kinds of information, including 
information held by their government.  Technology is clearly playing a large role in 





China's accession agreements with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001 added impetus to the movement toward greater openness by requiring the 
country, as an international commitment with other member countries, to make trade-
related rules and requirements transparent.  China agreed to only enforce those laws, 
regulations and other measures that have been published and are widely available; make 
those measures available to WTO members before they are enforced absent emergency 
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conditions; designate an official journal for the publication of relevant legal and policy 
documents; provide an opportunity to comment before measures are implemented; and 
establish one or more enquiry points where requesters can obtain information within 30-
45 days.  Standard WTO rules do not generally require, as does China’s accession 
protocol, that its members must establish enquiry points or provide a public comment 
period before a trade measure can be implemented.  These commitments were 
specifically negotiated with China in order to compel changes in China’s underlying legal 
system to facilitate greater transparency. 18      
 
China’s leaders at all levels take these commitments seriously, conscious also that 
review mechanisms have been established under the WTO to monitor China’s 
compliance with its accession agreements.  They have organized extensive training 
sessions throughout the country and study tours abroad to investigate means of 
implementing government transparency.  WTO transparency obligations are constantly 
cited by Chinese reformers in support of efforts to promote greater information disclosure 
and open government.  Implementation of these commitments is less than perfect,19 but 




Although the drive for greater transparency, especially in financial matters, most 
notably derived from China’s farmers, they do not appear to have lobbied for change in 
any organized or well-articulated manner. Indeed, Chinese law and policy prohibit 
citizens from forming issue-oriented associations without official approval and do not 
provide clear channels for input into the policy process. The Chinese experience differs, 
then, from diverse countries like India, Peru and Romania, where grassroots activism 
played an important and public role in bringing about access to information legislation.20  
Although social organizations, including business associations and consumer and 
environmental groups, may well be engaged in pressing for more open information, 
information on any such activities is not readily available.  Instead, it appears that 
China’s academics and political leadership at various levels have spearheaded the 
movement for greater information openness in and beyond China’s villages.  
 
As gleaned from Party and government policy statements and academic writings, the 
leadership’s motivation to move toward greater openness turned on a combination of 
pragmatic goals: to involve a wider spectrum of the public in making increasingly 
complex policy decisions and laws to support China’s drive for economic development; 
to curb rampant corruption with its negative economic and social consequences; to 
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establish new mechanisms to ensure social stability and build trust in government; and to 
comply with China’s transparency commitments in its 2001 WTO accession agreements.   
 
The leader most associated with China’s modern economic reform process, Deng 
Xiaoping, as early as 1984 endorsed the development of information resources to serve 
modernization.21  His vision and support boosted China’s embrace of information 
technology.  “Informatization,” the technological side of open information, is now a 
strategic priority in China’s Tenth Five-year Economic Plan (2002-07) and is recognized 
as key to achieving modernization. 
 
Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, developed leadership support of the “open 
government affairs” program, first introducing the concept officially in his report to the 
15th National Party Congress in 1997.22  He subsequently stressed the need to “keep the 
people informed” and strengthen “openness in government, factory and village affairs,” 
as well as “citizens’ participation in political affairs in an orderly manner,” in his report 
to the 16th National Party Congress in November 2002.23 Jiang and the Party thus set the 
necessary policy framework for greater access to government information and decision-
making processes.  State Council Premier Wen Jiabao, who is responsible for carrying 
out Party policy through government action, then called specifically, in his government 
work report to the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 
2004, to establish a system of “open government information” and to increase 
transparency of government work, in order to keep the people informed so they can 
exercise supervision over government work.24  Thus, by the Spring of 2004, China’s 
Party and government leaders were talking explicitly about the importance of 
institutionalizing open government information (OGI).   
 




China’s fundamental policy goal is social stability so the country can pursue rapid 
economic development.  China has moved cautiously from a highly centralized, planned 
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economy to a mixed economy that is replacing government mandates with more market-
oriented mechanisms, while retaining a single-party political system.  That system must 
find ways to accommodate increasingly divergent social, economic and political demands 
and an increasingly assertive public opinion made even more influential through the 
spreading use of the Internet.  
 
The Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party Central Committee in September 2004 called for 
Party members to improve their ability to run an increasingly complex nation, admitting 
in an unusually self-critical public statement that some of its own leaders lack quality, 
capability, integrity and close ties to the people.  The document warns that the "life and 
death of the Party" could hang in the balance if the Party’s governing style does not 
become more responsive to the people.25  It calls for supporting and improving open 
government affairs and systems to keep the people informed so they can better supervise 
government work.  Moreover, the Party endorsed “open Party affairs,” with greater 
transparency in Party work so that Party members can better understand and participate in 
internal Party work, themes that echo and should lend further support to transparency 
developments on the government side.     
 
No official Party or government document has articulated the details of what a formal 
OGI system might be.  However, the Secretary of the Party Central Committee’s 
Secretariat and Deputy Secretary of its Discipline Committee; He Yong, who also heads a 
Party Leadership Group on Open Government Affairs that was established in 2003, 
advocated in November 2004 that open government affairs be standardized so that 
society can better supervise government work, calling for affirmative disclosure of 
specified types of government information along the lines of the categories of 
information required under local OGI legislation to date.  He is the first high-level Party 
official to state publicly that, apart from state secrets, commercial secrets and individual 
privacy, all matters related to the interests of the people in the exercise of administrative 
power must be affirmatively disclosed to society.26 
 
It is clear that a combination of economic and political factors is driving the Party 
leadership toward recognition of the need to change its style of governance and to 
promote greater transparency.  Just as financial oversight was the primary motivation for 
greater transparency in village affairs, so the economic imperative to permit the free flow 
of information in order to realize sustainable economic development has been a driving 
force in the open information developments at the national level.  The Chinese 
government has long been the primary producer, repository and publisher of all kinds of 
information relating to social, economic and political affairs.  An oft-quoted statistic 
estimates that 80 percent of all useful information in China is held by the government, 
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and that most of this information is not public.27 Chinese scholars point out that a 
monopoly on information leads to waste of and inefficient allocation of resources, 
corruption and fraud, as well as policy-related constraints.  One example concerns 100 
counties in Shanxi province that applied for approval to build power plants utilizing their 
rich coal reserves, only to discover after a year of wasted effort that the existing power 
grid in the region could no longer accommodate any more power plants.28  
 
Despite the absence of national OGI legislation, a conducive policy framework is 
encouraging central government ministries to grant greater public access to their files and 
share an ever-wider array of information with the public, posting more and more 
information on their official websites and implementing a recently introduced 
government spokesperson system.  For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 
announced new measures to open its archives and declassified some 10,000 items from 
between 1949 and 1955, the first batch of diplomatic files to be released since 1949.29  
The National Auditing Office (NAO) decided in 2003 to make all its annual reports 
public and for the first time released the entire text and posted it on the NAO website.  In 
the past, these reports had been submitted only to the State Council and the NPC.30  In 
2004, the NAO created a national “audit storm” with its public report that 41 ministries 
under the State Council had misappropriated as much as the equivalent of US$171.56 
million, including the embarrassing news that the State General Administration of Sports 
had embezzled US$15.83 million from the country’s 2008 Olympics special construction 
fund.31   
 
Since its embarrassing initial cover-up of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SRAS) outbreak in early 2003, China is becoming more open in disclosing news about 
disasters, which typically have not been reported.  Observers were surprised when China, 
not known for transparency regarding its military, reported a fatal submarine accident in 
May 2003, and the Chinese press covered a series of troubling mining tragedies in the 
autumn of 2004.32  The State Council Information Office announced that government 
agencies will make more information accessible to the press and the public in 2005.33 
                                                 
27Li Jin, “Cong Henan Pingxing teda sharen’an kan gongmin de zhiqingquan wenti,” Criminal Law 
Review, available at: http://www.iolaw.org.cn/paper10.asp, citing for the 80% figure a study by Sun 
Yunchuan and Gao Jiubing, “Zhengfu wangshang xinxi ciliao huanjing guanli yanjiu,” Tushuguan zazhi, 
1999-1-1; see, also,  “Zhou Hanhua: Women weishenma xuyao zhengfu xinxi gongkai zhidu” [Zhou 
Hanhua: Why We Need an Open Government Information System], November 22, 2002, at 
http://chinese.mediachina.net/index_news_view.jsp?id=53801. “ 
28
“China Strives to Promote Transparent Government, Xinhua News Agency,” November 30, 2004.  
29
 See, “China Declassifies First Diplomatic Files, January 19, 2004, available online at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-01/19/content_1283797.htm; and <<Waijiaobu dang’anguan 
kaifang dang’an zanxing banfa>>, released in January 2004 and available online at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/dag/xgxx/t80375.htm.   
30
 “Auditing Reports to Open to Public,” China Daily, July 5, 2003. 
31
 “Premier Welcomes Audit Report on Government Departments,” People’s Daily, July 5, 2004. 
32
 Robert Marquand, “New Openness in China Disaster,” The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 
2004; and Anthony Kuhn, “Chinese Submarine Accident Kills All 70 Aboard,” Los Angeles Times, May 2, 
2003; “Accidents Reporting Shows a More open Government,” Xinhua News Agency, December 14, 2004, 
at:  http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/114996.htm.  
33
 “State to Speed Up Public Info Flow,” China Daily, December 29, 2004, at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/28/content_404046.htm. 
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These are just a few examples of diverse areas in which the practice and culture of greater 
openness is expanding.  
 
The Legal Framework for Information Access 
 
While open government information is now endorsed as a policy matter, China 
still lacks national OGI legislation, and Chinese law does not provide clearly for 
information rights.   Efforts to promote greater transparency under the “informatization” 
and “open government affairs” programs mentioned above have met with resistance from 
officials accustomed to preserving a shield of secrecy around themselves and their work.  
Despite high level articulation of the importance of open government affairs, that 
program was never institutionalized in a uniform manner throughout the country.  
Without clear legal requirements, governments and local bureaucrats have been free to 
decide how and to what extent to publicize government information and operations.  
Indeed, existing legislation, such as the Law on Guarding State Secrets, the State Security 
Law and the Archives Law, emphasizes secrecy, not disclosure of government-held 
information.    
 
In recent years, however, the State Council and some local governments have 
undertaken to “legalize” the open government affairs program through OGI legislation. 
An important accomplishment of China’s emerging OGI legal framework is that it 
establishes, for the first time in China’s long and rich history, rights on the part of the 
Chinese people to obtain government information and enforceable obligations on the 
government’s part to disclose information.   
 
Development of Basic Concepts 
 
China’s Constitution does not specifically address information rights.  However, 
certain constitutional principles do establish a legal basis for OGI and open governance.   
Article 2 stipulates the foundational principle that all power belongs to the people and 
that the people are to manage state affairs and economic, cultural and social affairs 
through various channels and in various ways.34  Article 3 makes the nominally elected 
congresses at all levels responsible to the people and subjects the congresses to 
supervision by the people.  Article 27 requires state agencies and functionaries to 
maintain close ties to the people, heed their opinions and accept their supervision, while 
Article 41 grants citizens the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding 
government agencies and their functionaries.  These constitutional principles provide a 
framework for more participation by Chinese citizens in all kinds of decision-making and 
other forms of supervising government.  China’s citizens cannot exercise these rights 
without adequate information. 
 
                                                 
34
 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted and promulgated on December 4, 1982 by the 
Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, as revised as of March 22, 2004,  is available in 
Chinese at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/15/content_1367387.htm , and in English 
translation (with amendments through 2004 at the end) at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.  
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As the open village affairs program gained in popularity and began to influence 
higher levels of administration at the grassroots level, economic pressure, including from 
increasingly significant foreign investors, prompted the central government to begin 
publishing more government documents and legislation.  Before 1991, little government 
information was made public directly.  It was primarily shared with lower level 
government agencies and only on a needs-to-know basis with others outside 
government.35   
 
Spurred on by the growing demand of foreign trading and investment partners and 
China’s desire to re-join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in March 1992 the 
State Council issued a directive to publish all national foreign trade and investment laws, 
regulations and policies.36   A1992 United States-China market access document called 
on the Chinese government, in a section entitled “transparency,” to publish on a regular 
and prompt basis all legal and policy documents pertaining to trade matters. 37  
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, China’s 1993 consumer protection law was apparently 
the first Chinese legislation to enunciate a “right to know,” stipulating that consumers 
enjoy the right to know and request accurate information about products or services that 
they buy, as well to know information about the protection of consumers’ rights and 
interests. 38  
 
Other national legislation soon established additional principles of openness.  A 1996 
revision of the Statistics Law added the system of regularly publishing comprehensive 
statistics and requiring the results of statistical investigations to be published.39   The 
Administrative Licensing Law (ALL) passed in August 2003 and effective July 1, 2004 
stipulates that the government licensing and approval process shall be open, unless state 
secrets, commercial secrets or individual privacy are involved. 40 Moreover, the ALL 
gives the public the right to inspect agency records relating to supervision of the 
implementation of licensed activities. The September 2003 Law on Environmental 
Impact Assessment promotes public participation in assessing the environmental impact 
of projects, and establishes a system to share environmental impact assessment 
                                                 
35
 Zhou Wei, “Zhongguo gonggong xinxi gongkai falu zhidu de tedian, wenti yu fazhan”  [The Special 
Characteristics, Issues and Development of China’s Legal System for Open Public Information], Journal of 
Administrative Law (No. 4, January 2002) at 2 [hereafter “Zhou Wei”]. 
36
 Id.; see <<Guanyu chongshen zhiding, fabu quanguoxing duiwai jingmao fagui, zhengce youguan 
guiding de tongzhi>> [Notice on Reaffirming the Provisions on Formulation and Publication of Nationally 
Applicable Foreign Trade and Investment-Related Laws, Regulations and Policies],  issued by the General 
Office of the State Council on March 26, 1992, available online at: http://www.law-
lib.com/lawhtm/1992/8471.htm.  
37
 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of The United States of America and The 
Government of People’s Republic of China Concerning Market Access, signed October 10, 1992, available 
online at: http://www.tcc.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit/cgi?204:64:03522014:193.  
38Article 8, <<Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiaofeizhe quanyi baohufa>> [Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Protecting Consumers’ Rights and Interests], Chinese version available at: 
http://www.eguo.com/channel/xiaofei/flfg/1.htm; English version available at 
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw26.htm.  
39
 Zhou Wei, supra note 35, at 3. 
40
 <<Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xuke fa,>> adopted September 27, 2003 and effective September 1, 
2004 , Chinese text at: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=79264. 
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information with the public.41  A local example is Shenyang Municipality’s pioneering 
legislation on “public participation in environmental protection.”42 It stipulates that 
environmental information is a public resource and provides for “environmental 
information rights,” as well as participation rights.   
 
While additional examples could be cited, existing legislation provides at best a 
piecemeal approach to making government information more accessible, without detailed 
procedures and without any overarching legal framework that would ensure that 
administrative agencies would respect, and the people’s courts would enforce, access 
rights.  That is what a national “freedom of information” or “open government 
information” statute could provide.   
 
Draft National OGI Legislation 
 
Apart from the policy statements mentioned earlier on promoting openness in village 
and government affairs, no national legislation or detailed guidance was developed to 
support the open government affairs program.  Seeking to institutionalize these concepts, 
deputies to the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress filed proposals in 2001, 
2002 and 2003 urging the drafting of a national OGI law to satisfy the citizens’ right to 
know, fulfill WTO commitments, help in legalizing government work, strengthen 
society’s ability to supervise government and realize the economic value of information 
resources.43 
 
These legislative proposals led to inclusion of a draft OGI law in the five-year 
legislative plan of the Tenth NPC (2002-07), and may have prompted the State Council 
Information Office to task the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in May 
2002, with researching and drafting legislation on open government information.  CASS 
formed a research group headed by CASS law professor Zhou Hanhua, who conducted 
extensive research on information access laws around the world.  
 
One of the group’s first dilemmas was whether to draft a law or an administrative 
regulation.  A law passed by the NPC could create new and enforceable rights, which 
local legislation cannot, and could cover the courts and the people’s congresses as well as 
government agencies.   However, drafting and deliberating national laws in the NPC 
                                                 
41
 <<Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa>>, adopted by the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee on October 28, 2002 and effective September 1, 2003, at: 
http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/649645345759821824/20021204/1036227.shtml.  
42
 See testimony of Brian Rohan of the American Bar Association and translation of the Draft Shenyang 
Municipal Measures on Public Participation in Environmental Protection at the website of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/012703/index.php. The Chinese text is available on the website of 
Shenyang’s Central Business District at: 
http://www.cbd.gov.cn/channel/kejiao/0007/a002/news_paper/200282821647.stm.  
43
“Guangyu zhiding “Zhengfu xinxi gongkai fa” de yi’an” [Proposed Bill relating to Formulating an Open 
Government Information Law], April 1, 2002, at: 
http://www.zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn/gb/paper289/1/class028900004/hwz204840.htm; and “Lianghui 
daibiao ti’an: zhiding <<Zhengfu xinxi gongkai fa>> [Deputies Propose Bill on Open Government 
Information Law], March 20, 2003, at: http://www.gov.cn/news/Detail.asp?sort_id=8604.    
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takes a much longer time than formulating State Council regulations. In the interest of 
developing a nationwide legal basis for OGI as quickly as possible, the research group 
decided to take the regulatory route.   Their experts’ proposed draft of National Open 
Government Information Regulations (the “Draft National OGI Regulations”) was 
submitted to the State Council in July 2002. 44   That draft, which has not been officially 
published, is still under consideration.  As happened in other Asian countries such as 
South Korea and Japan, China instead proceeded to permit local experiments with open 
information systems to gain experience before introducing an OGI system on a 
nationwide basis.   
 
 Local Experimentation 
 
Academics and government officials in the commercial city of Guangzhou (Canton) 
in China’s southern Guangdong province were among the first to begin drafting local 
OGI legislation. Exposed early on to foreign trade and investment via nearby Hong 
Kong, Guangzhou had been an early proponent of the open government and E-
government programs, and already had developed detailed local rules to implement open 
government affairs. Prompted to take additional concrete steps by an early 2002 central 
directive on further promoting open government affairs, the Guangzhou Office of 
Legislative Affairs contracted with academics at Guangzhou’s Zhongshan University and 
formed a working group in June 2002 to draft municipal-level provisions establishing a 
system of open government information (the “Guangzhou OGI Provisions”).   
 
The Guangzhou drafters say they did not have contact with the CASS research group 
in Beijing, and came up with idea of OGI legislation on their own, prompted by their 
experience with village affairs transparency movements in Guangdong province and the 
open government affairs program in Guangzhou, as well as overseas research conducted 
by Guangzhou-based officials and academics in Great Britain and the United States.  The 
Guangzhou draft apparently was circulated for discussion at a nationwide administrative 
law conference the summer of 2002.  While much of the terminology and ideas in the 
Guangzhou OGI Provisions is quite different, some of their language is the same as that 
in the Draft National OGI Regulations, so there appears to have been at least some cross-
fertilization, probably at that point.  In any event, the Guangzhou OGI Provisions, 
approved by the Guangzhou Municipal Government on October 30, 2002 and effective 
                                                 
44
 See, Zhou Hanhua, “Open Government In China: Practice And Problems,” in this volume. See, also, 
ZHOU HANHUA, ED., ZHENGFU XINXI GONGKAI TIAOLI ZHUANJIA JIANYIGAO [PROPOSED 
SCHOLARS’ DRAFT OF OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REGULATIONS] (China Law 
Publishers, 2003).  The Scholars’ Draft sets as its legislative purpose the protection of the public’s exercise 
of the “right to know” and of public participation in the management of state and social affairs, promotion 
of the flow of government information and supervision of government agencies in the exercise of their 
powers in accordance with the law.  It creates the presumption of information access, with non-disclosure 
being the exception, and gives all natural persons (thus apparently covering foreigners), legal persons and 
other organizations the right to obtain or access government information, except as otherwise provided by 
that regulation or other law.  Substantially in accord with local legislation passed to date, the Scholars’ 
Draft lists seven exemptions from disclosure that, with the exception of the exemption for “state secrets,” 
which under current law is overly-broad, conform generally to international practice. 
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January 1, 2003,45  made history by establishing unprecedented rights of access to 
government information in China.46  
 
The government of Shantou municipality, located in one of Guangdong 
province’s special economic zones, followed closely behind, as did the international 
commercial hub and special municipality of Shanghai, which adopted China’s first 
provincial-level OGI legislation (the “Shanghai OGI Provisions”) in January 2004.47  In 
February 2004, the business center of Shenzhen in Guangdong province passed China’s 
first “online OGI” provisions.48  By the end of the year 2004, over 24 provincial and 
municipal-level governments had adopted OGI legislation, and the spread of local OGI 
legislation nationally seemed to be accelerating. 
 
 New Information Rights 
 
Breaking the deeply-entrenched tradition of government secrecy, these local OGI 
provisions all establish a presumption that government-held information should be 
accessible, making non-disclosure the exception rather than the norm.  They aim to 
protect the “right to know” of individuals and organizations, a right that does not appear 
in China’s Constitution and is not defined, specifically as such, in any national law to 
date.   They establish two fundamental and, for China, novel ideas:  that Chinese 
government agencies have an obligation to disseminate on their own initiative and 
disclose upon request most of the information that they hold, and that Chinese citizens 
have a right to access such information.   
 
To emphasize this concept, the Guangzhou OGI Provisions define individuals and 
organizations as "persons with the right to access," and government agencies and their 
functionaries as "persons with the obligation to make public." While the Shanghai OGI 
Provisions do not use those terms, they similarly provide that citizens, legal persons and 
other organizations have the right to request information from government agencies and, 
conversely, they impose a legal obligation on government agencies to disclose all 
                                                 
45
 LIU HENG, ZHENGFU XINXI GONGKAI ZHIDU [THE SYSTEM OF OPEN GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION], China Social Science Publishing House (2004), at 192-93. 
46<<Guangzhousih zhengfu xinxi gongkai guiding>> [Open Government Information Provisions of 
Guangzhou Municipality], available online at:  http://www.gz.gov.cn/egov/sqgk/200309170002.asp ; see, 
Jamie P. Horsley, “China’s Pioneering Foray into Open Government,” The China Business Review, July-
August 2003 at 40; also carried at http://www.freedominfo.org/news/guangzhou (posted July 14, 2003, 
together with an English translation by the author).    
47<<Shanghaishi zhengfu xinxi gongkai guiding>> [Open Government Information Provisions of Shanghai 
Municipality], available online at: http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=91244; see, Jamie P. 
Horsley, “Shanghai Advances the Cause of Open Government Information in China,” at 
http://www.freedominfo.org/news/shanghai/index.htm, posted April 20, 2004, together with an English 
translation of the Provisions by The China Law Center, Yale Law School.   
48
 <<Shenzhenshi zhengfu xinxi wangshang gongkai banfa>> [Measures of Shenzhen Municipality for 
Online Open Government Information], February 25, 2004, at: 
http://www.chinacourt.org.flwk/show1.php?file_id=92369.   The Shenzhen Measures, which went into 
effect April 1, 2004, require government agencies to disseminate and post online on their own initiative 
some 35 items of information, but do not provide a mechanism for requesting information that is not 
disseminated.   
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information not covered by a specified exemption.49 
 
The local provisions further establish another new right, that of any person to 
access information concerning himself that is held by a government agency, as well as to 
request correction of any errors or inaccuracies in such information.  Individuals have not 
to date had the right to review personnel files maintained on them, for example.  Such 
files might contain information on high school and university transcripts, work records 
and employers’ comments. Although individuals have had no right to inspect such files 
and correct or challenge any erroneous or negative information, they have had to pay an 
annual fee to government agencies that maintain the files and for release of such files to 
prospective employers and others. In the past, companies could not sign a contract with a 
new employee without first obtaining the personnel file.50  Accordingly, the right to 
request access to one’s personnel file is important for confirming and correcting 
information as citizens seek to change jobs and as China begins to establish a consumer 
credit information system.   
 
The local OGI provisions all specify a non-exhaustive list of broad categories of 
information that must be disseminated on the government’s own initiative, a useful 
device in a country without a developed concept of “public record” information and 
where government is not accustomed to sharing information.  In addition to development 
plans, municipal rules and regulations, budgets and actual expenditures, and information 
about each government agency, these provisions require publication of information on 
issues of particular public concern, such as epidemics (like the 2003 SARS outbreak), 
natural disasters and other emergencies, and land use plans and approval documents 
relating to rural land requisition and urban redevelopment involving demolition of 
existing structures and relocation of residents.  The sometimes forcible expropriation of 
land and homes of farmers and urban residents due to rapid development has led to 
protests, litigation and a general public outcry for more transparency and what 
Westerners might refer to as procedural due process. Making the land use planning and 
development process subject to mandatory public disclosure, together with providing 
opportunities for the affected public to express their views on such plans, should help 
regularize this often controversial process.   
 
Under these OGI provisions, citizens are also given the right to request 
information from government agencies that has not already been disseminated, a right 
that Chinese citizens have never enjoyed before.  Information required to be disclosed 
affirmatively is generally published in periodic local government gazettes, local media 
and on the local government website, as well as made available at the agency itself for 
ease of public access.  Under most local OGI provisions, each government agency is to 
compile and update a catalogue of government information that it holds, as well as a 
                                                 
49
 The Guangzhou OGI Provisions specifically apply to foreigners requesting information, but other local 
OGI provisions are typically limited to Chinese citizens and organizations.  Nonetheless, some localities 
such as Shanghai have announced that foreign individuals, legal persons, organizations and news media 
will in practice be given equal access to government information. 
50
 See, e.g., “Resistance Rises Against Personnel Files,” Shanghai Daily, February 17, 2003, at: 
http://www.cbiz.cn/NEWS/showarticle.asp?id=1772.  
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guide on how to access that agency’s information.  Most OGI localities have already 
developed standardized request forms and user guides. 
 
Exceptions to the Rule of Access 
 
The local OGI provisions follow international practice in establishing categories 
of information that are exempted from the disclosure obligation, including private 
information about individuals, commercial secrets, state secrets and information 
regarding matters still under deliberation.  One goal of international legislation in this 
area is to specify with as much precision as possible the scope of necessary exceptions to 
the rule of openness, so as to prevent them from becoming huge loopholes for 
government non-disclosure.  In China, the concept of a "commercial secret" has been 
under development for several years, although the precise contours are not yet well 
defined. 51   However, notions of individual privacy and the protection of personal data, 
nowhere clearly expressed in law, remain to be fleshed out, 52 and the most troublesome 
exemption is that for “state secrets.”   
 
Invocation of the overly broad Law on Protecting State Secrets, adopted in 
1988,53  can still basically eviscerate the disclosure mandate of all OGI legislation in 
China. This law defines “state secrets” broadly as being “matters that affect the security 
and interests of the state.”  This definition is illustrated with broad categories of 
information including secrets concerning “important policy decisions on state affairs,” 
“economic and social development,” science and technology, and criminal investigations, 
as well as the more conventional areas of national defense and diplomatic affairs.  Public 
health information -- including information about diseases not yet listed by the Ministry 
of Public Health as a contagion that should be announced to the public -- is, for example, 
apparently treated as a state secret under existing implementing regulations.  Chinese 
officials and scholars have called for revision of the law to more clearly distinguish 
between what should be kept confidential and what can and should be disclosed.  
Although work on a comprehensive revision is in fact underway, a revised State Secrets 
                                                 
51
 Article 10(3) of the Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition defines 
“commercial secrets” broadly to mean “technical information or operating information that is not known by 
the public, can bring about economic benefits to the rightsholder, has practical utility and about which the 
rightsholder has adopted secrecy measures.”  <<Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan buzhengdang jingzheng 
fa >>, adopted September 2, 1992 and effective December 1, 1993, available at 
http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAW_Articles.jsp?LangID=2&CatID=503&langswitch=1; English 




 Although privacy rights have been asserted in some cases, there is no law clearly establishing such rights.  
Instead, the Constitution, Article 38, protects "personal dignity" and Article 40 protects the freedom and 
privacy of correspondence.  Article 101 of the General Principles of Civil Law protects the right of 
reputation, without defining the concept.   Recently, regulations on the use of computers and the Internet 
prohibit damaging "privacy," again without defining the term.  See, Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson, "Personal Data 
Protection in China," The China Business Review (July-August 2002) at 36. 
53Adopted September 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989, English translation available at 
http://www.intellnet.org/documents/000/060/65.pdf; text of Chinese original, <<Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo baoshou guojia mimifa >>, available at http://www.sss.net.cn/sassnews.asp?NewsID=766.  
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Law is not yet on the NPC legislative plan. Pending national action, local governments 
and requesters alike will be challenged to find ways to narrow its reach.   
 
Open Decision-making  
 
A major innovation of many local OGI provisions, not included in the Draft 
National OGI Regulations, is the stipulation that certain decisions should be announced 
during the drafting process for public input before they are finalized and implemented. 
These stipulations seek to further institutionalize mechanisms for greater public 
participation endorsed by the Party and authorized by the Legislation Law of the People’s 
Republic of China.54   These mechanisms include publication by people’s congresses and 
government agencies of draft legislation and policies to solicit public input in writing, as 
well as holding public hearings on selected legislation or administrative rules deemed to 
affect “vital” public interests.   
 
Following a trend set by the Guangzhou OGI Provisions, for example, the 
Shanghai OGI Provisions require the advance publication for comment of draft decisions, 
municipal rules and plans that affect the “major interests” of Shanghai residents or have a 
“major social influence.”  Indeed, the Shanghai Government Legislative Affairs Office 
adopted a public participation procedure in formulating the Shanghai OGI Provisions.  It 
published a draft for comment in two local newspapers and on the official Shanghai 
government website, and consulted various legal scholars, government officials, foreign 
experts, enterprises and non-governmental organizations.  This was the first time the 
government had sought public input on a draft regulation prior to adoption, although the 
Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress had published several draft laws for comment, 
and occasionally held hearings on them, in the recent past.  Shanghai and other local 
governments that include such a requirement in their OGI legislation are breaking 
additional new ground in terms of institutionalizing public participation and open 
government generally. 
   
 Implementing Open Government Information Systems 
 
A major challenge of OGI legislation is to make it workable, to ensure that 
citizens actually use the law and that government agencies actually provide required and 
requested information.55  The pioneering Guangzhou OGI Provisions, for example, went 
into effect amidst great fanfare on January 1, 2003.  But those provisions were entirely 
ignored by government officials, media and citizens when the SARS crisis that 
apparently started in or around Guangzhou first became public in February 2003.56   Even 
                                                 
54
 <<Lifa Fa>> [The Legislation Law], adopted by the National People’s Congress on March 15, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2000, available in Chinese at: http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/SFKSZN-c/82314.htm , 
and in English at: http://www.novexcn.com/legislat_law_00.html. 
55
 See the discussion of the importance of implementation in Laura Neuman and Richard Calland, 
“Establishing a Robust Transparency Regime: The Implementation Challenge - Theory & Practice, With 
Special Reference to Latin America, the Caribbean, and South Africa,” in this volume. 
56
 News of the spread of the strange new disease that came to be known as SARS first spread on panicked 
rumors reported around February 8, 2003.  When the Guangzhou Municipal Government and the 
Guangzhou Public Health Bureau held separate press conferences on February 11, apparently no-one 
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in the United States, where the media and citizens groups are more accustomed than in 
China to pressing the government for information, it took years for people to begin to 
recognize the usefulness and effectiveness of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 
opening government files to the public.   
 
Shanghai has done a particularly impressive job of spreading the word about their 
new OGI system.  Citywide, 15 municipal agencies felt to be particularly closely related 
to the interests of the public, including education, urban planning, social security and 
labor, were selected for special training to get their information access systems 
established by the date the Shanghai OGI Provisions went into effect.57  Outreach 
programs to potential users included business associations, lawyers groups, social 
organizations engaged in issues such as environmental and consumer protection, urban 
community councils, universities and scholars, the media and other groups, as well as 
government officials unaccustomed to the practice of openness. One wealthy district in 
Shanghai has incorporated training residents on how to access government information 
over the Internet into the community-based citywide program to put “one million families 
on-line.”  
 
In the first month after the Shanghai OGI Provisions took effect, the government 
reported that 21.64 million people searched for information on their website, and various 
government agencies received 63,600 phone inquiries.  The 15 key agencies reported 989 
requests for government information, to which 947 replies had been sent by month’s end.  
Within five months, 12 administrative reconsideration cases had been filed with different 
government agencies, plus four lawsuits.  Media also reported that the city of Wuhan, 
whose OGI provisions went into effect July 1, 2004, had ordered reconsideration of a 
request for information from the labor bureau by a laid-off worker that had been denied 
in August. These private enforcement actions indicate that at least some segments of the 
population in Shanghai and Wuhan are familiar with and using the new OGI legislation.  
  
Most of the local OGI provisions stipulate administrative penalties for 
government officials who do not disclose required information or otherwise violate 
requirements, and call for periodic investigations by local supervision agencies and 
government legislative affairs offices.  Shanghai went a step further in requiring annual 
reports on what information was disseminated, statistics on disclosure requests and the 
types of information that were either disclosed or denied based on an exemption, statistics 
on any lawsuits or complaints received, major problems and plans for improvement.  
Adopted from U.S. practice, this mechanism essentially incorporates OGI 
implementation into the performance reports of each agency and helps ensure they will 
pay at least minimal attention to carrying out the new system so they have something to 
report. 
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Another way to help ensure implementation is to give citizens effective 
administrative and judicial remedies to compel government agencies to make government 
information public.  Under the local OGI provisions and current Chinese law, residents 
are afforded only the traditional remedies of administrative complaint or administrative 
reconsideration by the agency that handled the information request in the first place, 
administrative litigation in the courts over specific government action or inaction, and 
civil suits for compensation in the event a violation of the provisions results in direct 
economic loss.  Despite the initial positive result in the Wuhan case cited above, many 
Chinese scholars believe that the administrative remedies are unlikely to provide a neutral 
remedy in many of these cases, and administrative litigation is available under existing 
law only in cases of infringement of personal or property rights.58  Whether the people’s 
courts will accept cases involving new “information rights” that are created by municipal 
or provincial level governments and not endorsed by a national law passed by the NPC, 
and how they will enforce the local OGI provisions, thus remain to be tested.  Observers 
note that China’s courts are not truly independent and have little latitude to interpret 
legislation.  However, the Shanghai courts set a positive example by accepting 
jurisdiction over the first known lawsuit under local OGI provisions in China.  That 
lawsuit was filed in June 2004, just a little over one month after the Shanghai OGI 
Provisions came into effect,59 and the hearing was held in August 2004.  The decision is 
still pending in a municipal district court.   
 
To avoid the shortfalls of the existing legal system, local governments might 
experiment with new institutions such as an independent information commission with 
adjudicatory powers, whose decisions could still be appealed to the courts, as is the case 
in the State of Connecticut60 and, more recently, in Mexico.61   However, the Chinese 
observe that such commissions are relatively expensive to maintain and would be yet 
another innovation to manage as they work to introduce the unprecedented OGI system.  
Another possible approach would be to establish an independent OGI office authorized to 
provide professional but non-binding advisory opinions to both requesters and 
government agencies, as is done in the State of New York,62 or an ombudsman system as 
is adopted in some other countries.  Shanghai’s mayor promised to establish a neutral 
body to handle OGI complaints,63 and the filing of the first lawsuit in Shanghai led to 
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consideration of forming an experts committee to advise on issues relating to OGI 
implementation.  
 
V.  Contemporary Challenges 
 
Prospects for National OGI Legislation 
 
China’s local OGI provisions are important first steps on the road to a national open 
government information law that will empower China’s citizens to participate more 
actively in the management of their own lives and country.   China’s leaders appear to 
accept that a free flow of information can foster better economic decision-making, curb 
corruption, build trust in government and thus contribute to economic development and 
overall social and political stability.  Just how free and open that flow should be has not 
yet been settled, however. 
 
In the wake of widespread criticism of the Chinese government’s secretive 
handling of the 2003 SARS crisis, which drove home the point that China is enmeshed in 
a global world that demands greater transparency, State Council Premier Wen Jiabao and 
other Chinese leaders and academics called for greater information openness.64  Many 
observers predicted that the central government would move quickly to adopt national 
OGI legislation.65  Although the State Council did act to promulgate national regulations 
on handling public health emergencies that called for timely, accurate and comprehensive 
sharing of information with society,66 deliberation on national OGI regulations has 
apparently been postponed, possibly to give local experiments –such as those in 
Guangzhou and Shanghai -- time to flesh out the many challenging issues of regulation 
and enforcement in this uncharted territory.  
 
Nonetheless, open government information has become a national policy.  In his 
report to the NPC annual meeting in March 2004, Premier Wen set as a task for 
government self-improvement the establishment of an OGI system and increased 
transparency of government work, to facilitate the people’s knowledge and their 
supervision of the government.67  The State Council’s 10-year program to implement 
“administration in accordance with the law,” announced soon after the close of the NPC 
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meeting, includes OGI as an important component.68  That program talks, importantly, of 
the public’s right to request open government information and calls on government 
agencies to facilitate that process.  
 
 The concept of a “right to know” first appeared in scholarly literature in the early 
1990s, and is now frequently cited in scholarly articles and media reports.  It was 
mentioned in an important Party document issued by the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party 
Congress Central Committee in September 2004 as one of the Chinese people’s 
“democratic rights” that need to be protected.69   The right to know was also listed as one 
of the civil and political rights China is protecting as part of its human rights program, in 
China’s “white paper” on Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 2003,70 released by 
the State Council Information Office on March 30, 2004.   
 
High-level policy statements are important, but only when information rights are 
granted status under national law will they be certain of legal protection throughout 
China and by the people’s courts.  The drafting of a national OGI law, which has been 
placed on the NPC legislative agenda for the current session running through 2007, will 
be important in itself and should also spur necessary work on related legislation, such as 
revising the State Secrets Law, drafting a privacy or personal information protection law 
and expanding the scope of administrative and judicial relief explicitly to cover 
information rights.   
 
Just as local experimentation often precedes central action, it is not unusual for China 
first to adopt administrative regulations at the State Council or ministry level, to gain 
experience while the supreme lawmaking body, the NPC, mulls over more 
comprehensive legislation on point.  This approach is the one apparently being followed 
in the case of China’s national OGI legislation.    
 
 Openness with Chinese Characteristics 
 
 The development of open government information in China over the past quarter 
century is noteworthy in several respects. 
 
First, China is moving toward greater openness without having first undergone a 
democratic transition, even though information access is commonly associated with 
democratic values.  Motivated primarily by its desire to ensure stability and continued 
economic growth at home, China’s authoritarian leaders seem to accept that more open 
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information benefits economic and social development. But they see it as a two-edged 
sword.  While loosening the reins on day-to-day governance and encouraging a more 
open style of governance with “supervision” by the people and the media, the Party still 
attempts to retain tight control over information flows and media reportage, issuing 
directives prohibiting or limiting reporting on corruption scandals, farmer protests and 
other sensitive news from time to time.  Current Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, 
heralded as a populist who “puts the people first,” has acquiesced in, if not led, a 
crackdown on free speech and the increasingly daring Chinese press.  Faced with 
widespread unrest in the cities and the countryside during 2004, officials have detained, 
demoted or arrested scores of prominent academics, writers, journalists, lawyers, peasant 
activists and whistleblowers who are perceived to criticize the Party or the government or 
who otherwise champion the causes of disaffected petitioners. 71  Those targeted are 
frequently accused of revealing state secrets.  Forty-two journalists and Internet 
dissidents are in Chinese prisons, more than any other country, according to the 
Committee to Protect Journalists.72  The actual implementation of the open government 
information policy clearly tests the new “liberalism” attributed to the Hu Jintao-Wen 
Jiabao government. 
 
It can be a struggle for citizens in well-established democracies like the United States 
to obtain information from reluctant government officials.  Information disclosure in a 
single-party state like China is likely to be even more of a challenge, subject to strong 
political, even more than legal, constraints, although Party officials may well point to the 
“state secrets” or other exemptions from disclosure under OGI legislation to justify 
withholding politically sensitive information. The first OGI lawsuit filed in Shanghai is a 
good example of the problem.  The requester sought access to seemingly innocuous real 
estate records from 1946 to 1968.  While complicated legal issues delayed the court in 
reaching a resolution, officials reportedly feared the requester’s motive was to seek 
documentary evidence to redress confiscation of real estate taken during the excesses of 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), during which many citizens lost property.  Using 
information access laws to open up past wounds, which in China could include those 
dating back to the original Communist revolution, various political and economic 
campaigns since then and the more recent 1989 Tiananmen Square actions, is a 
phenomenon encountered in transitional countries around the world.  The perceived 
threat of such use of information access laws to political stability may seem even greater 
in a country ruled by unelected leaders, and is undoubtedly part of the calculus behind the 
cautious approach to adopting such legislation in China. 
 
A second notable aspect of China’s growing government transparency as compared 
with other international experience is the relative absence of organized non-governmental 
or civil society input in the process.  While the current OGI program in China can be 
traced to the grassroots self-governance movement for China’s 900 million farmers, the 
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dynamic of its evolution seems to have been interaction between a generalized social and 
economic demand (probably made much more specific at times in certain localities), and 
leadership acquiescence and support.  Well-placed and influential academics, local 
officials and other individuals that represent widely shared views may be active behind 
the scenes in promoting this process, but the articulation of the need for and development 
of OGI in China has had a definite elitist rather than a popular flavor.   As civil society 
begins to develop and become more independent and active in China’s restrictive 
political-legal environment, and as it begins to realize the benefits of recent developments 
in open information, it may begin to get more involved in pressing for greater 
information access.  Whether and how an emerging civil society in China might 
contribute to promoting open government information will be issues worth watching. 
 
Third, the Chinese leadership’s early embrace of the technology that makes 
possible development of an “information society” to support economic development 
allowed creation of a technical platform that has facilitated China’s gradual move toward 
more open information.  Promoters of more open government information may well have 
used the leadership’s fascination with technical and “scientific” programs to support 
economic development to lay not only the technical foundation but also to introduce new 
practices of sharing information to advance the much broader development of OGI 
policies and practices.   
 
Fourth, while domestic concerns and developments can explain the impetus that 
has led to greater information transparency in China, international pressure and 
experience have also been brought to bear.  China’s transparency commitments in its 
2001 accession to the WTO are taken seriously by China’s leadership and used as an 
argument by OGI promoters in support of the need for OGI legislation.  Drafters at the 
national and local levels are all looking to learn from international experience, through 
research programs, international conferences and soliciting the input of foreign 
practitioners and legal scholars.   
 
Fifth, the spread of transparency in China has been incremental, based on a variety of 
complementary developments and experimentation conducted in different localities and 
within different bureaucracies with the approval of the center, as opposed to a distinct 
national reaction triggered by political crisis or scandal. Nevertheless, it is striking how 
quickly China’s nascent OGI movement is growing at local provincial, municipal and 
lower levels to create new rights and impose new obligations with consequences for 
noncompliant government officials. From a handful of OGI provisions in place at the 
beginning of the year, by the end of 2004, the number exceeded 24 at just the provincial 
and municipal level, not counting all the counterparts at lower district and agency levels.  
 
It is unclear to what extent local legislation can actually create new rights that will be 
enforced by the people’s courts, or to what extent both the people, not accustomed to 
having the right to request all kinds of information from their government, and the 
government bureaucrats guarding the gates to the agency files, will actually implement 
this important new system.  While statistics and the filing of lawsuits and administrative 
actions indicate that Shanghai and Wuhan residents seem to be learning about and 
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utilizing their new OGI system, officials in Changchun, the capital of Northeast China’s 
Jilin province, attribute the low number of visitors to the Changchun Archives 
Administration to search for information since local OGI legislation went into effect 
September 30, 2004, to unfamiliarity with the new system.73   
 
Nonetheless, these new OGI systems are introducing new practices of openness and 
attempting to change attitudes and the way citizens relate to their government, and vice-a-
versa.  Local governments are adopting slogans like “transparent government,”  “service-
oriented government,” “accountable government” and “law-abiding government” to 
describe how they see their role vis-à-vis society.  One example of the new attitudes 
being promoted by the current government is the licensing law that took effect July 1, 
2004,74 which many Chinese see as truly revolutionary. That law seeks to restrain the 
exercise of administrative power by restricting the number of government agencies that 
have authority to regulate activity through licensing and introduces the concept that 
government should intervene only where individual initiative or the market cannot 
adequately do so.  Transparency requirements permit citizens to monitor implementation 
of the licensing system.  As one Chinese official describes the impact of the 
Administrative Licensing Law, in the past Chinese viewed law as a means to control the 
people; now law is also being used to control government behavior.75 
 
Can a non-democratic China achieve true freedom of information, and accountable 
government?  In democracies, citizens can use the electoral process to bring pressure to 
bear even on unelected bureaucrats.  Even more direct pressure can be applied through an 
independent judicial system that has the authority to enforce government compliance 
with the law.  In China, in contrast, the Party ultimately controls the government 
personnel system and the courts.  Although Chinese citizens can sue government 
agencies for abusive acts or failure to act as required by law under the 1989 
Administrative Litigation Law, that law’s coverage is narrowly drawn and courts are 
frequently reluctant to accept cases that involve untested rights -- since they are only 
supposed to apply and not interpret the law -- or politically sensitive issues.76  Thus, 
Chinese citizens basically lack the means to compel government compliance with newly 
emerging rights of information. 
 
While Chinese officials do not have to account to the people in regularly 
scheduled and competitive elections, and are still infrequently held liable in the courts for 
their actions or inaction, they nonetheless clearly understand that their credibility and the 
legitimacy of their leadership depends in large part on being responsive to the concerns 
and needs of their people.  No government official welcomes public scrutiny of his or her 
decisions.  Yet the promoters of OGI include government and Party officials, as well as 
scholars well versed in international practice.  Many officials embrace these programs 
because they sincerely believe these mechanisms will help them do a better job, will help 
China develop on a sounder basis and will help ensure social stability in these times of 
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rapid change.  Apart from those matters of great political sensitivity, serious 
implementation of open government information systems could prove to be an important 
mechanism to help ensure that government becomes more responsive, if not strictly 
accountable, to the people.  In that sense, putting in place new systems of open 
government information to permit citizens to exercise their nascent “right to know” can 
prove to be a democratizing force in China.  Whatever the end result, it is undeniable that 
a new culture of openness is being fostered in China today, with the cautious 
acquiescence and support of the Communist Party.  Translating that culture into written 
law can only reinforce this positive trend.  
